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GUARDING THE DUMPING GROUND: EQUAL
PROTECTION, TITLE VII AND JUSTIFYING THE USE
OF RACE IN THE HIRING OF SPECIAL EDUCATORS
Patrick Linehan*
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way.**
!.INTRODUCTION

The disproportionate placement of black and other minority
students in special education programs has been a topic of con1
troversy for almost thirty years. Although considerable litigation has addressed various discriminatory practices, the flow of
these students into more restrictive educational environments
continues. Despite the aims of federal special education law to
provide equal educational opportunity to children with disabilities, special education classrooms have become "dumping
grounds" for many minority students whose teachers perceive
the students' classroom behaviors and learning styles as "disabilities."2
Considerable research attributes this imbalance to the cultural dissonance between black and minority student populaAssociate, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Yale university; Ed.M.,
Harvard University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like
to thank Professor Bill Taylor for his guidance with this piece, E. I. C. Ronald Z. Ahrens
and the rest of the BYU EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL staff for their helpful comments,
my colleague Patricia North for all her assistance with this article, and especially my
wife, Maya Bermingham, for her enduring support and love.
* * University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun J., Dissenting).
1. BETH HARRY, CULTURAL DIVERSITY, FAMILIES, AND THE SPECIAL EDUCATION
SYSTEM: COMMUNICATION AND EMPOWERMENT 59 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smith, Reliance on the Kindness of Strangers: The Myth of
Transracial Affinity Versus the Realities ofTransracial Pedism, RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2930 (1999) (noting that black children "are placed in special education classes in far
greater proportion than children of other races ... [and] are unable to escape special
education, as they are kept in special education longer than other children").
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tions and predominantly white teachers. Race-conscious employment measures could help close this gap. The permissible
rationales underlying race-conscious decisionmaking in employment have, however, gradually eroded at both the Constitutional and federal statutory level. But for the strategic settlement of the case of Piscataway Board of Education v.
3
Taxman pending Supreme Court review, race-conscious hiring
and placement plans designed to counteract the teacherstudent cultural gap leading to this disproportionality may, at
least according to some proponents of affirmative action, have
been taken off the life support on which the Rehnquist Court
4
has gradually put it.
To address effectively the disproportionate referral and ultimate placement of black and other minority students in special education, school districts must be permitted to take affirmative measures in the hiring and placement of minority
educators in capacities that would place them at the gates of
the special education classroom. Section II of this article examines the extent to which minority students are disproportionately thrust into special education and the educational effects
this placement has on these students. Section III identifies the
cultural gap between minority students and predominantly
white teachers as a major cause of this trend. Moreover, it argues that black and other minority educators, who tend to reciprocate the culture of these students, could play an important
role in lessening the effects of this disconnect.
Section IV examines the parameters of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and concludes that the
anti-dumping rationale, as a variation of the diversity rationale, constitutes a compelling state interest as required under
the Equal Protection Clause. It then examines the parameters
of Title VII as established by the Supreme Court, as it applies
to non-remedial affirmative action in the public sector, and
3. See Linda Greenhouse, Tactical Retreat, New Jersey School Move Leaves Affirmative Action in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1 (stating that the case
ended with an unusual financial settlement, 70% of which was financed by a group of
civil rights organizations).
4. See, e.g., Katrina Patterson, Note, What May Have Become A New Title VII
Precedent on Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman- "Permissible or Impermissible?," 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 355,
380 (1999) (noting that "[t]hose in favor of the settlement .... viewed it as an effective
legal strategy to prevent bad cases [from] mak[ing] bad law") (internal quotation omitted).
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concludes that the anti-dumping objective is also a permissible
interest under Title VII.
II.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE SPECIAL EDUCATION CONTEXT

The earliest cases involving challenges against racial discrimination in the administration of special education took aim
at the discriminatory impact of culturally biased assessment
5
instruments. Two additional and interrelated areas of special
education administration have come under recent fire: (1) the
definitions of basic constructs, and (2) the existence of faulty
6
referral and assessment practices. To understand the nature
of these areas of concern, we must first examine the administrative structure created by federal special education law.
Congress sought to establish a federal mandate that school
systems provide programs which would serve the unmet needs
of handicapped children, while also ensuring that the rights of
such children would be protected. The first major piece of federal legislation addressing special education was the Education
7
of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EHCA"). EHCA was
subsequently amended several times and is now known as the
8
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The
original Act attempted to combine both a civil rights and an en9
titlement approach. Although IDEA in its current form has
since added findings that reflect additional concerns with ac5. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (enjoining
placement of African-American students in classes for educably retarded on basis of
criteria which placed primary reliance on IQ test results); Parents in Action in Special
Educ. (PASE) v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding, despite finding that a minor portion of IQ test was culturally biased, that challenged tests did not
discriminate against African-American children in assessment for special education).
See also Alfredo J. Artiles & Stanley C. Trent, Overrepresentation of Minority Students
in Special Education: A Continuing Debate, 27 J. SP. EDUC. 410, 420-21 (1994) (stating
that "[i]ntelligence tests are merely a device to assess an individual's level of acculturation to the dominant culture ... [W]e should use multiple indicators to assess intelligence across ethnic groups because certain individual differences ... are greatly shaped
by culture").
6. Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 420.
7. Pub. L. No. 94-142, (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1999)).
8. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455 (1975). See also S. Rep. No. 105-17 (1997) (stating
that one purpose of IDEA amendments is "to strengthen the capacity of America's
schools to effectively serve children ... with disabilities").
9. MARK G. YUDOF, ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 725 (1992) (citing
Yudof, Education for the Handicapped: Rowley in Perspective, 92 AM. J. EDUC. 163
(1984)).
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10

countability and local control, the law has retained its original overarching goal of providing appropriate educational services to children with disabilities.
Toward these ends, the law both prohibits discrimination
and guarantees a "free appropriate public education" to all students.11 It also establishes a requirement that school districts
design an "individualized educational program" (IEP) that sets
forth specifically designed instruction to meet the unique needs
12
of handicapped children. Federal special education law places
significant emphasis on the role of the student's parents in the
special education placement and the formulation of the IEP for
13
their children. Parents are guaranteed notice of any changes
14
in their child's educational placement and are afforded several levels of procedural guarantees. These guarantees include
the opportunity to challenge a school's determination of the
child's educational placement through a "due process" hear16
15
ing, administrative appeal, and the right to sue in either
17
federal or state court.
Although criticism of federal special education law revolves
around its highly bureaucratic and overregulated nature, imprecisiOns in the regulatory scheme's coverage raise concerns
regarding the potential for discretionary error in student

10. Congress recently added to its official findings that:
Over 20 years of research and experience has [sic] demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by - (A) having high
expectations for such children and ensuring their access in the general curriculum
to the maximum extent possible; ... (C) coordinating this chapter with other local,
educational service agency, State and Federal school improvement efforts; ... (G)
focusing resources on teaching and learning while reducing paperwork and requirements that do not assist in improving educational results.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (1999).
11. ld. at § 1400(c)(3).
12. ld. at § 1414(d) (setting forth procedural requirements for development and
maintenance of child's Individual Education Program).
13. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C) (1999) (requiring parental consent before
child's initial evaluation for special education); § 1414(b)(4)(A) (1999) (requiring inclusion of child's parent in process of determining whether child has disability); §
1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (1999) (requiring inclusion of child's parent as member of individual
education program team).
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(f) (1999) (requiring state educational agency to ensure
that the parent of each child with a disability are members of any group that makes a
decision on the education placement of their child).
15. 20 u.s.c. § 1415(f) (1999).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (g) (1999).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (1999).
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evaluation. First, IDEA does not go very far in providing precision in the definition of a disability for purposes of special education placement. It establishes broad categories of "disabili18
ties" within its statutory definition. Although several of the
classifications within this definition are rarely subject to discretionary error (for example, "traumatic brain injury" or "autism"), categories such as "serious emotional disturbance" and
19
"specific learning disabilities," leave room for subjective considerations in student evaluations and assessments. For example, deciding whether a student exhibits "inappropriate" types
of behavior under "normal circumstances" requires an ultimately subjective determination of what behavior is "inappro20
priate" and what constitutes "normal circumstances."
18. "Child with a disability" is broadly defined as a child "with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance ... , orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (1999). Federal law grants even broader
discretion to the state for children aged 3-9, where it permits the state at its discretion
to designate as a "child with a disability" a child "experiencing developmental delays .. .in one or more of the following areas: physical development, cognitive development, communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive development." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (1999).
19. "Specific learning disability" is defined as "a disorder in one or more of the
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken
or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think,
speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A)
(1999). Although "serious emotional disturbance" does not have a statutory definition,
the Department of Education defines it as:
a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child's educational
performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory or
health factors.
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships
with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.
34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4) (2000).
20. Subject consideration can also permeate the use of formal assessment instruments in evaluating student eligibility for special education. See Beth Harry & Mary G.
Anderson, The Disproportionate Placement of African-American Males in Special Ed.
Programs: A Critique of the Process, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 602, 607 (1994) (noting that
AAMR's lowering of an IQ test's cutoff score for identifying students as educably men-

tally retarded demonstrates an arbitrary shift in classification and noting that special
education categories are defined "the parameters of normalcy defined by a given cultural group''); see also James H Lytle, Is Special .Education Serving Minority Students.?
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Second, although much attention is given to the procedures
by which state and local educational agencies must conduct
their evaluation of students for special education eligibility, no
attention is given to the process by which a student initially
enters the pre-placement evaluation process. With little regulatory guidance in this area at the federal level, referrals for
evaluation are usually left to the discretion of the student's
teacher and are based primarily on the teacher's perce~tion of
1
the student's classroom performance and behavior. If a
teacher determines that a particular student is in need of
evaluation for special education services, the evaluation process is triggered, subjecting the student to potential stigma and
22
risk of misclassification. The problem of teacher discretion is
exacerbated when one considers the high rate at which students who are referred for special education evaluation are
subse~uently placed in some sort of special education environment. To a large extent, a teacher's referral for evaluation can
seal a child's educational fate.
Finally, whatever theoretical advantages are gained by the
current federal special education law, the actual provisions of
special education services under this regulatory scheme often
stray from the law's spirit of fairness and professional collaborative decision-making. The law's requirement that assessment
for special education purposes be non-biased and conducted by
a multidisciplinary team has been found difficult to imple24
ment. For example, Boston public schools reported in the
early 1980's that they had no established protocol of entrance
and exit criteria for students placed in restrictive special edu25
cation settings. One study of the special education process
concluded that the decision-making process that occurs in formal placement meetings often does not demonstrate a model of

A Response to Singer and Butler, SPECIAL EDUCATION AT THE CENTURY'S END (Thomas
Hehir & Thomas Latus eds., 1992) (arguing that labeling creates a formal and medicallike model for what is, at bottom, a subjective construct).
21. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
23. HARRY, supra note 1 at 85; see also Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 421 (noting that student referrals expose students to the risk that diagnostic systems of
questionable validity and reliability will identify false positives).
24. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 602.
25. Ronda Goodale & Marcia Soden, Disproportionate Placement of African·
American and Hispanic Students in Special Education Programs, ERIC DIG. EDUC.
204873 at 2 (1981).
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26

"rational" decision-making. Among the evidence supporting
this conclusion was the practice of excluding potential placement or service options from consideration in determining stu27
dents' appropriate educational placement. The outcome of
placement meetings also tend to be heavily influenced by
higher status school personnel within the professional team,
who present their reports in such a way as to make it difficult
for other team members and parents to understand the infor28
mation and form an opinion. Often these formal meetings are
merely ratifications of decisions made privately by administra29
tors prior to the formal placement meeting.
This is not to say that special education requires more federal regulation to govern referral and other aspects of the
placement process. Indeed, critics are quite correct in noting
the failings of the federal law's often paralyzing effect on as30
pects of educating special-needs students. However, it is important to note that the putative advantages that teacher and
administrative discretion may bring to an otherwise overbureaucratic system of educational administration may also be
accompanied by a heightened risk of error in student assessment and classification.

III. SPECIAL EDUCATION: A DUMPING GROUND FOR MINORITY
STUDENTS

A

The Disproportionate Placement of Black and Minority
Students in Special Education

An unfortunate outgrowth created by the combination of
vague legal classifications defining "disability" and the broad
discretion left to teachers and other school personnel involved
in student placement is the disproportional placement of black
and other minority students in special education programs.
This section explores this outgrowth, the reasons underlying it,
and the negative effects misplacement in special education in-

26. HARRY, supra note 1, at 85.
27. !d. (citing A.H. MEHAN ET AL., HANDICAPPING THE HANDICAPPED: DECISIONMAKING IN STUDENT'S EDUCATIONAL CAREERS (1986)).

28. !d. at 85-86.
29. !d. at 86.
30. !d.
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flicts upon these students.
The placement of black and other minority students in special education programs was intentionally employed by school
districts in the post-Brown desegregation efforts to avoid the
desegregation effects. However, this practice has remained an
unconscious reality in public schools throughout the United
31
States. In 1955, surveys conducted in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
revealed that four predominantly-black census tracts were the
source of more than twice the referrals for suspected mental retardation when compared to all the other areas of the city combined.32 More than forty years later, there has been little sig33
nificant change in this trend. A 1987 study shows that
between 1978 and 1986 Blacks were over-represented in the
34
Seriously Emotionally Disturbed (SED) category. This is also
evidenced by a 1983 study that found that Blacks were overrepresented in almost 66% of state and local educational a~en
5
cies in programs for students with learning disabilities. A
1992 survey by the Office of Special Education evidenced a con36
tinuation in this trend from 1986 to 1992. A 1982 study by the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that while black students were overrepresented in the educably mentally retarded
(EMR) category nationwide, overrepresentation of other minorities was likely to occur onl~ in those states where such mi7
nority populations were high. Beth Harry noted that black
males are overrepresented in all disability categories, particularly the cate~ories likely to be served in segregated classrooms
3
or buildings. The trend is clear: minority students continue to

31. See Smith, supra note 2.
32. Walter C. Farrell, Jr., et al., Discrimination in Educational Placement and
Referral, 21 INTEGRATED EDUC. 122, 123 (1983).
33. Philip C. Chinn & Selma Hughes, Representation of Minority Students in Special Education Classes, 8 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 41, 43 (1987).
34. ld. Chinn & Hughes also found that whites were consistently underrepresented in EMR and TMR classes, and proportionately represented in SED, LD and
speech impaired classes. I d. at 44.
35. Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 412-13 (citation omitted).
36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992) cited in Harry & Anderson, supra note 18,
at 604.
37. Harry & Anderson supra note 18, at 604; see also Chinn & Hughes, supra note
31, at 43 (noting that the national problem of disproportionately high numbers of Hispanics in EMR classes may no longer exist.)
38. Harry & Anderson supra note 18, at 605. See also Dewey G. Cornell, Gifted
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be placed in special education settings at a rate that far outpaces their representation in regular education settings.
As a general matter, a student's placement in special education, even where the student's classification is "correct," is
not without costs. Special education placement, particularly
where it results in a student's separation from the regular education setting, can have adverse educational effects. These effects are two-fold: 1) emotional trauma to the student, and 2) a
reduction in the quality of education provided. First, the way
special education places a student into a category can often be
traumatic and stigmatizing. Labeling children in a way that
identifies that child with a learning difficulty generally leads to
39
stereotypical attitudes and beliefs associated with the label.
Even where the labeling stems from misclassification, the public designation as a "special ed kid" shapes the way others interact with the child, negatively influencing the child's selfperception.40 This effect often leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy,
which generally ends with the child assuming the negative attributes that others had already presumed the child had by vir41
tue of the label.
Second, special education placement, despite its objective of
guaranteeing a free appropriate public education, can often reduce the quality of the student's educational experience. Research has produced conflicting results on whether special education, at least for the "mildly handicapped," provides an
education comparable to that provided in the regular education
42
setting. One critic of special education noted: "Many educaChildren: The Impact of Positive Labeling on the Family System, AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 322, 322 (1983) (noting that false labels imposed upon a child "shapes
the way other interact with the child and negatively influences the child's selfperception").
39. Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 416 (noting "deleterious effects" on "teacher's
attitudes and expectancies and pupil's self-esteem and social status").
40. See ROGERS ELLIOT, LITIGATING INTELLIGENCE: IQ TESTS, SPECIAL
EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1987) (noting the negative effects teacher expectancy can have on student behavior) (citations omitted). See also
JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: HOW ScHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 189 (1985)
("[A] stigma results from placement in low groups that is likely to have a negative long
term consequences, including lowered self-esteem and aspirations of students and lowered teach expectations for them that can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy.").
41. OAKES, supra note 40.
42. Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 418; see also HARRY, supra note 1, at 83
(stating that "research on effective schools suggests that effective instructional practices and school environment as a whole contribute more to student performance than
do particular types of settings.").
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tors are unwilling to admit that programs for the mildly handicapped have yet to demonstrate anything other than negative
43
benefits." Additionally, it has been suggested that Individual
44
Education Plans often reduce the curriculum to drivel. In45
deed, the "intellectual segregation" of underperforming students also contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Teachers
tend to have lower expectations of special education students,
and consequently "teach less" as a self-imposed accommodation
46
to the student's perceived mental shortcomings.
Disability classification must occur at some level in order
for schools to fulfill their federal mandate to provide "free appropriate public education" for those whose disabilities clearly
and objectively hinder learning in the regular education setting. However, students are often placed based on what often
are subjective considerations. For example, teacher observations of poor academic performance and "inappropriate" behavior impose a stigma, the cost of which is not necessarily counterbalanced by a more individualized educational environment.
Because teachers have broad discretion in referring a child
for special education evaluation and due to the inevitable degree of subjectivity permitted under IDEA, a child's educational fate often turns on the teacher's perception. The way
teachers view a particular student's academic and social behav47
ior lies at the heart of the referral process. Thus, students
perceived by their teachers to be potential candidates for SED
classification, bypass more objective formal assessment instruments.48
Research demonstrates that broad discretion that allows
subjective determinations under IDEA permits the influence of
the cultural disconnect between many minority students and
their teachers. This contributes significantly to the disproportionate placement of these students in special education settings.49 While a significant number of students in public schools
43. Lytle, supra note 18, at 192.
44. !d. at 191.
45. See LARRY W. HUGHES ET AL., DESEGREGATING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 14 (1980)
("Resegregation on intellectual grounds is probably just as damaging to students as
desegregation on racial grounds.").
46. OAKES, supra note 40, at 75-78 (discussing inequitable "distribution of knowledge" among high and low ability academic tracks).
47. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 611.
48. !d.
49. !d.
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are racial minorities, the teaching profession remains dominated by white women. 5° Although the cultural norms of individual students and teachers are not determined solely by race
and ethnicity, researchers have found that different experiences between white teachers and minority students result in
subjective distinctions concerning a student's ability to learn.
Conscious and unconscious racism and cultural bias infiltrate the educational process at a number of different levels. A
lack of cultural awareness often results in overreferral or inappropriate referral of minorities to the most restrictive special
51
education programs. Despite IDEA's express prohibition of
the classification of students based on cultural or other envi52
ronmental influences, teachers often evaluate student competency based on factors that include race and cultural characteristics. 53 Although such considerations may not be intentional,
student evaluation teams are often composed solely of white
educators who may be unaware or unconscious of the racial
4
and cultural bias they bring to the decision-making process. 5
This bias is particularly true for black students. Several
features of black student behavior can be perceived negatively
by white female teachers, including the high physical activity
or "verve" of black boys and patterns of language learning and
55
usage. These behavioral characteristics often do not coincide
with the traits, such as rigid, conforming, and passive behaviors, valued by the (predominantl~ white) teaching profession6
als of middle-class school culture. Black students are seen as
50. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 610.
51. Goodale & Soden, supra note 25, at 3.
52. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (Supp. IV 1998) (excluding form definition of"specific
leaning disability" learning problems resulting from "environmental culture of economic disadvantage").
53. Robert Rueda, An Analysis of Special Education as A Response to the Diminished Academic Achievement of Chicano Students, in CHICAGO SCHOOL FAILURE AND
SUCCESS; RESEARCH AND POLICY AGENDAS FOR THE 1990S 259 (R. Valencia ed., 1991) .
54. Goodale & Soden, supra note 25, at 2-3.
55. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 610.
56. Goerge B. Helton & Thomas D. Oakland, Teachers Attitudinal Responses to
Differing Characteristics of Elementary School Students, 69 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 261, 263
(1977). Research has also shown that teachers are concerned and disturbed by such
behaviors as arguing or "fussing" with teachers and peers. Jerry B. Hutton, Teacher
Ratings of Problem Behaviors: Which Student Behaviors "Concern" And "Disturb"
Teachers?, 21 PSYCH. IN THE SCHOOLS 482, 482 (1984). If unfamiliar with the cultural
meaning of many of these behaviors, teachers may respond impulsively to children as
their feelings dictate, rather than rationally, as good practice required. Id. All this is
not to say that confrontational behaviors should not be addressed by teachers. This ar-
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fun-loving, happy, cooperative, energetic, and ambitious by
black teachers, while they are more likely to be seen as talka57
tive, lazy, high-strung, and frivolous by white teachers. White
teachers rna~ often be unaware of a black male student's life
8
experiences.· As a result, the knowledge and skills of these
59
students often go unrecognized .
The most significant manifestation of white educators'
negative perception of minority student behavior is that white
educators are more likely than non-white educators to refer
60
minority students for special education evaluation. Research
demonstrates that regardless of ethnicity, teachers tend to
more frequently refer students from backgrounds other than
61
their own to specialized educational services. One explanation
given for this is that teachers are unfamiliar with the cultural
values of the student's ethnic group, and hence regard behavior
which may be appropriate within the minority culture as being
62
inappropriate in the middle class culture of schools. In a context where a predominantly white teaching force services a
predominantly minority student population, it is not surprising, then, that these students are disproportionally steered into
special education. In one study, teachers were found three and
one-half times more likely to refer an African-American student for special education than an European-American student.63 In another study, white teachers demonstrated a higher
tendency to recommend sgecial education than Hispanic or African-American teachers.
It has been noted that teachers evaluating the severity or

tide argues only that these behaviors, when misread by a predominantly white teaching profession, often become grounds for inappropriate referral to and placement in
special education.
57. HERBERT GROSSMAN, ENDING DISCRIMINATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 18
(1998).
58. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 612.
59. Id.
60. Sigmund Tobias et a!., Special Education Referrals; Failure to Replicate Student-Teacher Ethnicity Interaction, ERIC DIGEST, ED 224221, at 6 (concluding that
white teachers tend to make special education referrals than non-white teachers; See
also Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 421 (noting that "teacher prejudices, racial bias,
expectations and differential treatment contribute in influencing referral decisions").
61. See Sigmund Tobias eta!., Bias in the Referral of Children to Special Services,
ERIC DIG. EDUC. 08637, at 7-8 (1981); see also Tobias eta!., supra note 60, at 2.
62. Tobias eta!., supra note 60, at 3.
63. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 19 (citation omitted).
64. Tobias eta!., supra note 60, at 7.
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deviancy of student behavior problems judge the exact same
behavioral transgression as more severe or deviant when it is
65
committed by a black male student than a white student. One
commentator explains the racial baggage many white teachers
bring to student evaluation:
Many of the [special education) teachers would not live in a
desegregated neighborhood, did not favor mandatory school
desegregation, felt the civil rights movement did more harm
than good, and felt that the problems of prejudice were exaggerated. One-third believed that Blacks and whites should not
be allowed to intermarry. Furthermore, the majority of the
teachers perceived their white students to be superior intellectually, socially and in other characteristics relevant to
66
school achievement.

What makes the situation worse for these students is the
general perception among regular educators that special education classes serve as an easily available option to reduce the
demands of the regular education classroom. For many teachers, students whose behaviors differ from the cultural norm are
better off with the special educator, whose specialized trainin~
and expertise are more well-suited for "behavior problems."
As one commentator explained, "It seems that the answers to
students' difficulties in the regular classroom are all too often
sought by attempts to refer students to special education
rather than seeking to improve the quality of regular education."68 Moreover, both regular and special educators operate
69
under incentive systems associated with the referral process.
The conscious and unconscious cultural and racial biases
that many white teachers bring to the classroom stand in clear
contrast to what researchers have concluded about black and
other minority teachers. In contrast to the general teaching
population, black and other minority teachers have been found
to be less prejudiced toward black and other minority students.
65. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 70.
66. I d. at 68 (citation omitted).
67. Goodale & Soden, supra note 25, at 8; see also HARRY, supra note 1, at 85.
68. HARRY, supra note 1, at 85.
69. Artiles & Trent, supra note 5, at 42; see also Goodale & Soden, supra note 25,
at 4 ("The conception of special education as the savior for all educational, social, and
emotional problems has contributed to the disproportionate placement of minorities in
special education programs."); Tobias et a!., supra note 58, at 5 (finding that special
education teachers are more likely to make a special education referral than regular
education teacher).
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Research demonstrates that African-American or Hispanic
teachers have a lower tendency to recommend a child to special
70
education than white teachers. Black teachers have also been
found to give more positive feedback to black pupils than that
71
given by white teachers. One group of commentators explains:
Since a black teacher shares racial experiences with the black
student, including experience as a black student, a black
teacher is more likely to be supportive of a black student who
has trouble in class. This implies that such a teacher would be
less likely to (1) discipline a black inappropriately and (2) conclude inappropriately that a black student belongs in a low72
'l' c1ass.
a b11ty

Consequently, where there is a high percentage of AfricanAmerican teachers in a school district, there is a decrease in
73
the overrepresentation of black students in special education.
Boston public schools, for example, made a conscious effort in
1981 to incorporate minority educators into a working subcommittee on special education referral, and assigned to every
student evaluation a ~rofessional of the same race as the stu4
dent being evaluated. As a result, although the rate at which
Blacks and other minorities were placed in the pre-referral and
referral stage did not decrease, the number of black learners
placed in special education as a result of a new referral de. 'fi1cant1y. 75
crease d s1gm
Yet, race-conscious measures taken to counteract disproportionate referrals by an overwhelmingly white faculty does not
imply that all white teachers are either racist or have an unconscious cultural bias. I do not suggest that school districts
should not sign an order tomorrow to lay off all white teachers
and replace them with minority teachers. However, using race
as one of several criteria in making hiring and placement decisions in the area of special education will increase the likelihood that there will be a culturally qualified educator partici70. Tobias et al., supra note 60, at 6.
71. Joseph Stewart Jr. et al., In Quest of Role Models; Change in AfricanAmerican Teacher Representation in Urban School Districts, 1968-1986, 58 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 140, 143 (1989).
72. /d. at 143.
73. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 75; see also Stewart et al., supra note 71, at 140
(noting evidence of link between proportion of African-American teachers and equal
educational opportunities for African-American students).
74. Goodale & Soden, supra note 25, at 5.
75. /d. at 7.
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76

pating in the evaluation of a referred student. For example,
"Rather than supporting the teacher's already held stereotypes
of the ghetto child, the [black] psychologist can try to help the
teacher to see his/her own constraints and incompetencies and
provide the teacher with the non-directive support needed for
77
most situations involving self-change." The current special
education student evaluation process, which may be difficult to
monitor and control, can be helped by placing black and minority "special educators" such as, special education teachers, psychologists, social workers and other regular education teachers
that participate regularly in the evaluation process, at the entrance gates of special education. This type of employment action will help counterbalance and minimize the cultural bias
that currently drives the student evaluation process.
IV. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND TITLE VII:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SPECIAL EDUCATOR
EMPLOYMENT

The need for adequate representation of black educators in
the special education process is clear. The presence of black
educators at the referral, evaluation and instructional stages of
special education significantly minimizes the potential for the
disproportionate placement of black students in special education within a school district. The use of race in the hiring and
placement of special educators would facilitate the positioning
of "culturally reciprocating" adults at critical stages of the spe78
cial education system. These placements would prevent minority students from falling victim to the failings of the potentially adverse effects of teacher discretion. Further, efforts to
eradicate the conscious and unconscious teacher bias in referring minority students to a separate track of education would
help the process to be fair and equal; qualities the United
76. See, e.g., Goodale & Soden, supra note 25, at 5.
77. Aaron D. Gresson, The "Educational Psychologist" in African-American Special Education, 49 J. NEGRO EDUC. 41, 50 (1980). Cf Barbara Holmes, Do Not Buy the
Conventional Wisdom: Minority Teachers Can Pass the Test, 55 J. NEGRO EDUC. 335,
336-37 (1986) ("black teachers have been good teachers, who traditionally played a vital role in the formation of values and expectations of black students.").
78. See BETH HARRY ET AL., BUILDING CULTURAL RECIPROCITY WITH FAMILIES:
CASE STUDIES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 6-9 (1999) (arguing that effective special education requires that teacher be able to "reciprocate" the cultural values of student and
family).
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States Founding Father's highly esteemed:
Family lineage, wealth and education of parents, cultural difference - to select and discriminate according to these factors
was abhorrent to the founders and followers of American democratic institutions long before the current classes of race
79
and handicap were generally acknowledged.
Affirmative measures to increase black employment would
reduce intra-school resegregation, reduce the number of black
students "dumped" into a special education system, and move a
school district closer to providing equal educational opportunities for all of its students.
However, the virtue of such a measure as a matter of policy
does not end the inquiry. To implement a program geared toward achieving sufficient black and other minority representation at the various levels of special education, the policy must
survive both Constitutional and statutory scrutiny. As a "state
action," such a policy would be subject to the exacting scrutiny
of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.80 As an employment policy, such efforts could also create
an actionable claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The
next Sections examine whether an employment policy that uses
race as a hiring consideration of teachers in the special education context would survive challenges under both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII.

A.

The Equal Protection Clause and the Anti-Dumping
Rationale as a Compelling State Interest

1. The Wygant Decision
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the standard of
strict scrutiny be applied to all race-based classifications by
81
governmental entities. Under this analysis, the challenged
classification must both serve a compelling state interest and
82
be narrowly tailored to serve the state interest. Most relevant
to this Article, the Supreme Court applied this analysis to a
school district's affirmative action employment policy in Wy79. OAKES, supra note 40, at 190.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
82. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
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gant v. Jackson Board of Education.
In Wygant, the Board of Education in Jackson, Michigan,
responding to heightened racial tension in the community, negotiated an affirmative action layoff agreement with the local
84
teachers union. The agreement provided that in the event
that it became necessary to lay off teachers, teacher seniority
would govern, except that "at no time w[ould] there be a
greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of
85
the layoff." When the school district was faced with the need
to lay off teachers, it refused to honor the affirmative action
86
provision of the labor agreement. The union and two of its
minority members who were laid off in violation of the contractual provision brought suit in federal court alleging that the
School Board's action violated the Equal Protection Clause un87
der the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After the suit was dismissed
88
in federal court for lack of jurisdiction, the complaining parties turned to the state court system and prevailed not on an
89
Equal Protection grounds, but on breach of contract. The state
court ultimately rejected the Board's argument justifying the
non-application of the layoff provision because such action
90
would violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After the Board began enforcing the provision, the laid-off
non-minority teachers brought suit in federal court challenging
the legality of the provision on both Equal Protection and Title
91
VII grounds. The district court upheld the validity of the layoff provision, holding that racial preferences in hiring need not
be grounded on a finding of historical discrimination a~ainst
minorities in order to survive Constitutional scrutiny. The
court found that the provision was permissible under Equal
Protection analysis as an attempt to remedy societal discrimi93
nation by providing role models. The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

476 U.S. 267 (1985).
Id. at 270.
!d.
!d. at 271.
!d.
!d.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 271-72.
!d. at 272.
!d.
!d.
!d.

196

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

and certiorari was granted on the Equal Protection Clause
94
claim.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's findings in
a 5-4 vote with five separate opinions. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Powell reiterated that strict scrutiny was the appropriate level of analysis where, as was the case here, a state action
operated "against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and
95
therefore constitute[d] a classification based on race." As to
whether the contractual provision's purpose to remedy societal
discrimination constituted a compelling governmental interest,
Powell wrote that "the Court ha[d] insisted upon some showing
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to
96
remedy such discrimination." Although the plurality opinion
required a specific showing of prior discrimination by the
school district itself, it did not require that the requisite prior
discrimination occur in the same specific arena at which the
97
challenged racial classification was aimed. Rather, focus was
placed on the prior discriminating practices of the School Board
98
generally. Thus, the Court did not explicitly require that the
prior discrimination for which a specific showing was required
to have occurred in the area of personnel hiring. A showing
that there was specific past discrimination exercised by the
school district in any area of its decision-making would have
been a sufficient governmental interest to satisfy the compel99
ling state interest prong of strict scrutiny. In this regard, Wygant leaves open the possibility that, at least within the bounds
of the Equal Protection Clause, a school district can attempt to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination in one area under its
governance by aiming a race-based policy at another governing
area. Under Wygant, proof of discrimination against students
in special education referral could theoretically provide a state
interest compelling enough to implement racial preference in
hiring practices.

94. Id. at 273.
95. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
96. Id. at 274.
97. Id.
98. Id. ("[T]he Court has insisted upon showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order
to remedy such discrimination").
99. ld.
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Wygant also addressed the "role model" theory, on which
the lower court relied in upholding the Board's plan. In rejecting this theory, Justice Powell's primary concern was its lack of
a stopping point. Justice Powell wrote that a school board
would be permitted to engage in "discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate
0
remedial purpose." Powell also warned that allowing such a
justification for race-based decision-making by school districts
could on the one hand provide justification for keeping a small
percentage of minority teachers to parallel the small percentage of minority students, while on the other hand reinforce the
principle that black students are better offwith black teachers,
a theory that was firmly rejected in Brown v. Board of Education.101 The fractured nature of the Wygant decision, however,
illustrates that a distinction between the interests of providing
role models and faculty diversity was not lost on some members
of the court.
In concurrence, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the distinction between the provision of role models and the maintenance
of a diverse school personnel: "The goal of providing 'role models' discussed by the courts below should not be confused with
the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the
102
faculty."
Likewise, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, Justice Marshall suggested that race can play a
role in the pursuance of educational objectives attainable
through diversity. Marshall also noted that racially-motivated
violence that had erupted at the schools made urgent the im103
perative to integrate the public schools. The dissent by Justice Stevens was even more explicit in its recognition that racial considerations are permissible to achieve educational
objectives: "In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student
body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all104
white, faculty."
The four dissenting votes, together with

100. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275.
101. !d. at 276 ("Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are
better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in
Brown .... ").
102. !d. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. !d. at 306-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. !d. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor's implicit acknowledgement that educational diversity can be a compelling state interest, establishes a fiveJustice majority on the Wygant Court that a school district affirmative action hiring policy aimed at promoting faculty diversity would satisfy the compelling state interest prong of Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.

2. The Bakke Decision
The objective of achieving diversity as a compelling state
interest is also articulated in Regents of the University of Cali105
fornia v. Bakke. In Bakke, a white applicant to the medical
school at University of California at Davis challenged an affirmative action admissions ~olicy that established a quota sys06
tem for minority applicants. In another sharply divided vote
of 5-4, the Supreme Court struck down the policy as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Powell, again writing for a
plurality, concluded that since the classification in question
was racial in nature, strict scrutiny applied, rejecting the argument that Bakke was not a member of a discrete and insular
107
minority. Although the Court ultimately found that the admissions policy was not narrowly enough tailored, Powell's
opinion did find that the state's interest in maintaining a diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to satisfy the
first prong of strict scrutiny. Powell wrote that the attainment
of a diverse student body "clearly is a constitutionally permis108
sible goal for an institution of higher education." In doing so,
the Court invoked the four essential freedoms of "academic
freedom," which "though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
109
First Amendment." These four essential freedoms include the
freedom "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taughti how it shall be taught, and who
10
may be admitted to study." Because the medical school "invoke[d] a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the
105. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. OfEduc., 476 U.S. at 288
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. !d. at 280·81.
107. !d. at 290.
108. !d. at 311-12.
109. !d. at 312.
110. !d. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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First Amendment[,] . . . [it] must be viewed as seeking to
achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfill111
ment of its mission."
Although the plurality's discussion focused solely on diversity in the higher education context, the opinion contained no
explicit limiting language that would restrict this interest to
extend its applicability to the elementary and secondary school
context. As the opinions of the "Wygant Five" illustrate, the
compelling interest of racial diversity in the field of education
applies with equal force in the formulation of elementary and
secondary school policy. Even before the Bakke plurality's acknowledgement that student body diversity rose to the level of
a compelling state interest, the Court had identified the importance of student diversity in the public elementary and secondary school context. In Swann u. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board
112
of Education, the Court expressly recognized that the educational objectives of public schools may permit the use of race in
school district decision-making:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power
to formulate and implement educational policy and might
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students
to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white ~tudents reflecting the propor113
tion for the district as a whole.

The Court has also recognized repeatedly the importance of
114
public education in American life. The "essential freedom" to
determine "who may teach" and "how it may be taught" should
include the school district's freedom to structure the racial
composition of its staff in furtherance of fulfilling its educational "mission."
Even if student and faculty diversity in the area of education can be compelling enough to survive the first prong of
strict scrutiny analysis, the question still remains whether the
111. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
112. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
113. Id. at 12.
114. See, e.g., Board. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) ("[P]ublic schools
are vitally important ... as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system."'); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests,
long has been recognized by our decisions.").
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"anti-dumping" interest falls within this category. The argument that the "anti-dumping" interest falls into the diversity
interest rubric is subject to attack on at least two grounds.
First, it can be argued that because the "anti-dumping" interest
promotes ethnic and racial "sameness" as opposed to diversity,
characterization as a form of diversity interest is inappropriate.
This interest may be arguably more akin to the role model the115
ory expressly rejected in Wygant.
In this light, the doubleedged dangers cited in Wygant would be implicated by the assumptions underlying the "anti-dumping" interest, particular!~
1 6
the danger of "reifying the stereotype," repudiated in Brown,
that black students are better off with black teachers. Second,
it can be argued that by bringing in more minority teachers to
serve minority students, any race-conscious hiring policy will
implicate the concern articulated by the Court in Green v.
117
County School Board that the integration of school faculties
118
is a mandatory component of the Brown mandate.
Regarding the analogy of the "anti-dumping" interest to the
role model interest, the two rationales are dissimilar in two
significant respects. First, "anti-dumping" interest does not
rest on the premise that all black students are necessarily better off with black teachers, but rather on the premise that certain minority students are less likely to be steered into the special education system when similar minority educators, who
are less likely to see culturally variant behavior as evidence of
a disability, are incorporated into the referral and evaluation
process. The "anti-dumping" interest is consistent with the
principle that a black child can learn just as effectively from a
white teacher as from a black teacher, because the rationale
does not rest on any assumptions about learning. It addresses
the constitutional threat of teacher referrals to special education that may be based on conscious or unconscious racism or
ethnocentrism. Because the objective would be to eliminate any
racial element from the special education process, the gatekeeping role of the black special educator would be to correct
any racially-driven referrals or evaluation, such that black students are returned to the mainstream classes taught (ideally)

115.
116.
117.
118.

4 76 U.S. at 275-76.
See generally, Brown v. Board. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968).
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by a racially integrated faculty. The black special educator
would also enable white teachers to become more familiar with
their own unconscious cultural biases and misinterpretations of
119
student behaviors.
Regarding the second argument, the faculty integration
problem today is not that black students are too often being
taught by black teachers; if anything black teachers are under120
represented in the teaching labor force. Moreover, to the extent that affirmative measures in the hiring of black special
educators does have a resegregating effect on the racial composition of particular school or district's faculty, it may serve as
an effective means to prevent the dumping of a disproportionate number of black students into special education classrooms.
Given the number of different ways school tracking and abilitygrouping policies effectively separate black and other minority
students from white students, more black special educators in
a given school or district may have a significant desegregative
impact on school and classroom composition.
A better characterization of the "anti-dumping" interest is
that it is a long-term goal of bringing diversity to public school
faculties. It is the overwhelming cultural homogeneity of the
faculty that contributes significantly to the disproportionate
placement of minority children. There is often no special educator with an alternative cultural understanding for students
standing at the precipice of the special education ravine. It is
this lack of faculty diversity that renders the culturally different behaviors of many black and other minority students "inappropriate." Although affirmative measures to obtain more
black educators may seem to be "anti-diversity," they seek to
enhance the cultural diversity of public schools by keeping minority children within the relatively more integrated educational mainstream. In this sense, this version of the diversity
rationale seems more compelling than diversity for its own
sake.
B. The Anti-Dumping Rationale and Title VII
The constitutional question presented by race-based affirmative action in the hiring of special educators is a relatively
straightforward one: is the policy narrowly tailored to serve a
119. See Gresson, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
120. Harry & Anderson, supra note 20, at 612.
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compelling state interest? As this article has argued, the disproportional number of black students referred to and placed in
special education resulting from the cultural disconnect between white teachers and their black minority students provides a sufficient basis for finding a compelling state interest
under the rubric of diversity. Moreover, a policy that treats
race as one of several considerations in hiring decisions would
likely be narrowly tailored enough to satisfy the second prong
. 121
. t scru t.my ana1ys1s.
of s t nc
A more difficult question is whether such a policy would
survive a Title VII challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for any employer to ... fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race .... "Although the original intent of Title VII was to
regulate private discrimination in the workplace, Congress
amended Title VII in 1972 to bring public employers to the
122
statutory definition of employer.
Thus, since 1972 the employment policies of state and local governmental agencies
have been governed by the dual mandates of Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause.
123
In United Steel Workers of America v. Weber,
the Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of Title VII to
voluntary affirmative action plans in the private sector context.
The race-based policy at issue was a plan for on-the-job training that mandated a one-for-one quota for minority workers
124
admitted to the program.
In an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, the Court upheld the validity of the contractual provision.125 Rejecting the argument that Title VII was intended to
prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans, the Court
pointed to portions of the legislative history that reflected a
Congressional intent not to inhibit the private sector's ability to

121. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978) (noting
that a decision-making policy that treats race as one of many considerations would
probably satisfy strict scrutiny's "narrowly tailored" requirement"). A policy that focuses on hiring and placement rather than lay-offs would also have a higher likelihood
of surviving strict scrutiny. See Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1985) (noting that valid
hiring goals place less of burden on innocent white workers than race-based lay-offs).
122. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1999)).
123. 443 u.s. 193 (1979).
124. ld. at 199.
125. /d. at 209.
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"tak[e] effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress de126
signed Title VII to achieve."
In holding that Title VII's prohibition on racial discrimination does not condemn "all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action [plans]," the Court was careful to restrict the
scope of Weber, defining at the outset the limited nature of its
holding: "the narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing
upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the Kai127
ser-USWA plan." It also repeatedly focused on the private
nature of the policy. In this respect, the sequence of the Court's
argument is significant. It begins its analysis with references
to various points in the legislative history espousing the overarching legislative intent. The references to the congressional
record statements noted the "plight of the Negro in our economy,"128 as the Court pointed to evidence that the employment
anti-discrimination measures embedded in Title VII served to
achieve the higher, more general purpose of facilitating the integration of Blacks into various aspects of American society.
The quoted Senate floor statements reflect the Court's understanding that Title VII filled a critical gap in already existing
federal anti-discrimination law:
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it
do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his
modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take
full advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no
129
hope of getting a job where he can use that education ?

The Court also pointed to similar statements made by
President Kennedy upon his introduction to Congress of the
Civil Rights Act of 1963: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he
130
has no cash in his pocket and no job." By invoking this generalized Congressional intent-enabling of Blacks' the enjoyment of rights protected under previously enacted anti126. Id. at 204.
127. I d. at 200.
128. Weber, 443 U.S. at 203 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
129. Id. at 203 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 6547 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
130. I d. (citing 109 Cong. Rec. at 11159 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)).
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discrimination law-the Court created the backdrop against
which future Title VII challenges should be analogized. Its emphasis on Title VII's coordinate relationship with other antidiscrimination laws suggests that courts should recognize its
purpose as an "enabling" statute for other anti-discrimination
law when addressing the legality of a race-conscious measure,
regardless of whether the measure is private or public, legally
mandated or voluntary.
Only after the Weber Court had established the interpretive
backdrop against which Title VII should be read, did it address
the specifically voluntary and private nature of the affirmative
action plan in question. The Court first cited from a House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act: "Federal legislation
dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other
131
forms of discrimination." In further support of this conclusion, the Court noted the importance of the traditional Congressional resistance to the regulation of private business m
the ultimate enactment of the legislation:
Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those
legislators demanded as a price for their support that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms ... be left undis132
turbed to the greatest extent possible.

Thus, the Court found within the broad interpretive umbrella of Title VII, as articulated at the onset of its opinion, a
specific Congressional intent to permit private sector employers to adopt voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans
without the threat of Title VII liability.
Next, while expressly declining to "detail a line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
133
plans," the Court proceeded to identify three particular factors of the Kaiser Plan that rendered it permissible under Title
VII. First, the Court noted that the plan's purpose mirrored
that of Title VII, in that: "[b]oth were designed to break down
134
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."
Second,

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 203-04 (citing H.R. Rep. no. 914, 98'" Cong. 1"' Sess. 1, 18 (1963)).
!d. at 206 (citation omitted).
!d. at 208.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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"[t]he plan did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees": that is, it did not require the replacement ofwhite
135
employees with black employees.
Finally, the court placed
importance on the temporary nature of the plan, noting that
the preferential selection of Blacks would end as soon as the
percentage of black, skilled craftworkers approximates the per136
centage of blacks in the local labor force.
Despite its focus on these three factors of the Kaiser plan in
justifying its compliance with Title VII, the Court declined to
adopt them as exclusive requirements for affirmative action
137
plans to comply with Title VII. The limited holding of Weber
is simply that an employment policy falling into the category of
private and voluntary race-based affirmative action plans are
not necessarily prohibited under Title VII. The Court spoke
nothing of a "test for all seasons," nor did it address Title VII's
relationship to the Equal Protection requirements governing
public sector employers. Indeed, the limited parameters of Weber are further illustrated by the opening sentence of the
Court's legal analysis: "We emphasize the narrowness of our
inquiry. Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the
138
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
C. Weber and the Public Employer: Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County
Nearly ten years after Weber, and two years after Wygant,
the Court was presented with a slightly different category of
race-conscious affirmative action plan in Johnson v. Transpor139
tation Agency, Santa Clara County, where the plan was not
voluntary and private but put in place by a local governmental
entity. This case differed in significant respects from both We140
ber and Wygant.
The plaintiff in Johnson was a male em-

135. ld.
136. ld.
137. See id. at 208 ("We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold that
the challenges plan falls on the permissible side of the line.").
138. Id. at 200.
139. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
140. Unlike Weber, Johnson involved a policy established by a public employer.
Unlike Wygant, it involved a challenge under Title VII, rather than an Equal Protection challenge. !d.
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ployee who challenged the local transportation agency's decision to Eass him over for a promotion in favor of a female em1 1
ployee. The agency's decision was made in pursuance of an
affirmative action plan directing that sex or race be considered
for the purpose of remedying underrepresentation of women
142
and minorities in traditionally segregated jobs. Although the
defendant in Johnson was clearly a state actor for purposes of
the Equal protection Clause, the Court was presented only with
a Title VII claim, as the constitutional issue was neither raised
nor addressed in the litigation below.
In affirming the agency's plan, the Court shoehorned it into
the Weber category of remedy-based affirmative action plans. It
first laid early emphasis on the explicitly stated intent of the
challenged plan: "The Agency stated that its Plan was intended
to achieve 'a statistically measurable yearly improvement in
hiring, training and promotion of minorities and women
throughout the Agency in all major job classifications where
143
they are underrepresented."' With the remedial nature of the
plan as context, the Court recognized the lower court's holding
that "since the Agency justified its decision on the basis of its
Affirmative Action Plan, the criteria announced in Weber . ..
should be applied" in evaluatinq its validity. In agreeing that
44
Weber was controlling authority, the Court implicitly ratified
approvingly that the Plan was properly characterized as a Weber-type case by virtue of its remedial purpose. The Court's decision was necessarily guided by the Weber decision not simply
because it was a Title VII claim, but because it was a Title VII
145
claim against a remedy-driven affirmative action plan.
As
such, the Weber criteria applied, notwithstanding the agency's
146
status as a state actor.
That the Weber criteria only applied to race-based policies
that are remedy-driven is supported by language in the concur141. ld. at 625.
142. ld. at 621-22.
143. ld. at 621.
144. See id. at 627-28 ("The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be
guided by our decision in Weber.").
145. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628.
146. In examining the plan under the guidance of Weber, however, the Court declined, as it did in Weber, to establish a definitive test for determining the legality of
race-based remedial affirmative action under Title VII. In upholding the agency's remedial plan, the Court found that the agency's plan exhibited two of the factors identified as dispositive in Weber. !d.
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renee by Justice Stevens, one of the swing votes in Johnson's 63 decision. Justice Stevens made explicit what the opinion of
the Court left implicit: the law after Weber and Johnson "does
not establish the permissible outer limits of voluntary programs undertaken by employers to benefit disadvantaged
147
groups."
He noted that judicial interpretation of Title VII
must necessarily "leave 'breathing room' for employer initia148
tives to benefit members of minority groups." In light of the
overarching purpose of Title VII to benefit minority groups,
Justice Stevens construed Title VII not only to encourage employer scrutiny of possible exclusions of minorities in the past,
but also to permit beneficial considerations of minority groups
that are both generalized and prospective:
Public and private employers might choose to implement affirmative action for many reasons other than to purge their
own past sins of discrimination. The Jackson school board
"said it had done so in part to improve the quality of education in Jackson -whether by improving black students' performance or by dispelling for black and white students alike
any idea that white supremacy governs our social institutions. Other employers might advance different forwardlooking reasons for affirmative action: improving their services to black constituencies, averting racial tension over the
allocation of jobs in a community, or increasing the diversity
of a work force ....All of these reasons aspire to a racially integrated future, but none reduces to "racial babncing for its
149
own sake."

This less restrictive construction of Title VII echoes the
concern expressed in Justice Stevens' dissent from the Court's
decision in Wygant, where he criticized the ruling's failure to
recognize that race-conscious decisions can often serve sound
150
(and constitutionally permissible) educational purposes.
Where non-remedial educational objectives may have suffered
a blow on the Constitutional level in Wygant, the implicit cordoning off of remedy-driven affirmative action plans in Weber
and Johnson leaves in place school district's ability to use race-

147. !d. at 642.
148. I d. at 645.
149. Id. at 647 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-Comment, Sins
of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 96
(1986)).
150. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

208

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

conscious employment decisions to accommodate the "racial
and ethnic needs" of diverse student populations.
V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY V.
151
TAXMAN,
A LOST CHANCE?

Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed directly
the permissibility of non-remedial race-based teacher employment decisions under Title VII, it almost had the opportunity
to address this issue when it granted certiorari to the Third
Circuit decision of Board of Education of the Township of Pis152
cataway v. Taxman. In Taxman, intervenor-plaintiff Sharon
153
Taxman, a white high-school business education teacher, was
laid off by the school board ("the Board") in favor of retaining
the high school's only black teacher in the business depart4
ment. L Although the statute of limitations for an Equal Protection challenge under Section 1983 had already been ex155
ceeded, Taxman challenged the district's decision under Title
156
VII. The district court granted partial summary judgment for
the plaintiffs, holding that the plan, regardless of its objective,
157
was overly intrusive on the rights of non-minorities.
On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed, but focused squarely
on the issue of whether the plan's non-remedial objective of
maintaining a diverse faculty comported with the intent of Title VII's prohibition of racial discrimination. It reasoned that
under both Weber and Johnson, race-based affirmative action

151. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
152. ld. For commentary on the Taxman case, see generally Fred Hartmeister, The
Taxman Cometh: Reductions in Force and Affirmative Action, SCHOOL Bus. AFF., July
1995, at 9 (summarizing reasoning of Taxman court); Henry Schuldinger, Note, Still
Searching For the Limits of the Permissible Use of Affirmative Action: United States v.
Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, 6 GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 97
(1996); Brendan M. Lee, Note, The Argument for Faculty Diversity: Recommendations
After Taxman v. Board of Education, 27 STETSON L. REV. 739 (arguing that faculty diversity generally should be recognized as a valid affirmative action goal under the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII).
153. The original Title VII suit was filed by the federal government. Ms. Taxman
eventually intervened. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
154. Id. at 1551.
155. Id. at 1552 n.5.
156. ld. at 1552. Taxman also pursued a claim under New Jersey's employment
anti-discrimination statute.
157. United States v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp.
836, 851 (D.N.J. 1993).
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policies in the employment context must serve one of the two
purposes underlying the original enactment of Title VII: (1)
ending discrimination and guaranteeing equal opportunity in
the workplace; and (2) remedying the underrepresentation of
158
racial minorities.
Because the Board's "diverse faculty" rationale did not fall within one of these two rubrics, the Court
held that its termination of Ms. Taxman was in violation of Title VII. It explained:
The affirmative action plans at issue in Weber and Johnson
were sustained only because the Supreme Court, examining
those plans in light of congressional intent, found a secondary
congressional objective in Title VII that had to be accommodated - i.e., the elimination of the effects of past discrimination in the workplace. Here, there is no congressional recognition of diversitl as a Title VII objective requiring
15
accommodation.

Regarding the Board's argument that diversity is a permissible objective in implementing race-based employment policies
in the educational context under Bakke, the Court deftly
avoided addressing the issue directly. Instead of offering rebuttal, the Court concludes in summary fashion:
While we wholeheartedly endorse any statements in these
cases extolling the educational value of exposing students to
persons of diverse races and backgrounds, given the framework in which they were made, we cannot accept them as authority for the conclusion that the Board's non-remedial racial
diversity goal is a permissible basis for affirmative action un160
der Title VII.

In addressing the significance of the Bakke decision in particular, the Court , after an extensive summary of the opinion,
concludes simply that "Bakke's factual and legal setting, as
well as the diversity that universities aspire to in their student
bodies, are, in our view, so different from the facts, relevant
law and the racial diversity purpose involved in this case that
161
we find little in Bakke to guide us."
Finally, the Court addressed the concurring opinions of
158. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
159. Id. at 1558.
160. Id. at 1561.
161. I d. at 1563 n. 14. The Court also rejected the Board's invocation of statements
in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), noting that the decision was
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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Justices O'Connor and Stevens in Wygant and Johnson, respectively. The Court noted that Justice O'Connor, following Wygant, rejected an expansive view of the purposes that may underlie affirmative action in her concurring opinion in Johnson,
citing her statement that "contrary to the intimations in Justice Stevens' concurrence, this Court did not approve preferences for minorities 'for any reason that might seem sensible
162
from a business or social point of view."' Moreover, the Court
dismissed Justice Stevens' comments in his Johnson concurrence concerning the "idea of forward-looking affirmative action
where employers do not focus on purging their own past sins of
163
discrimination" as not controlling.
In holding that non-remedial objectives are not a permissible grounds for a race-based employment plan under Title VII,
however, the Third Circuit paid little credence to the overarching intent of Title VII as identified in Weber and the categorical
approach followed in both Weber and Johnson. Ignoring Weber's
explicit articulation of Title VII's purpose as the enabling for
racial minorities the enjoyment of other rights free from discrimination, the court redefined Title VII as having two primary goals limited to the context of the workplace: (1) ending
discrimination and to guarantee equal opportunity in the
workplace; and (2) remedying the under-representation of minorities.164 Based on this improper limitation of Title VII's purpose as recognized in Weber, the court concluded that an affirmative action plan must have a remedial purpose in order to
165
be valid under the statute.
Otherwise, the plan would not
"mirror the purposes of the statute" and would therefore fail
166
the first prong of the Weber test.
Aside from its overly restrictive articulation of the purposes
of Title VII, treatment of the criteria examined in Weber and
Johnson as a "test" for all affirmative action plans contradicts
the explicitly limited holding of Weber and its application in
Johnson. To the extent Weber does establish a "test," it is a test
that applies only to the category of remedially-driven racebased decisions. The proper analysis for testing the validity of
non-remedial affirmative action under Title VII was left by the
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563 (citations omitted).
!d. (internal quotations omitted).
!d. at 1557.
!d.
!d.
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Supreme Court in Johnson for another day - a da~ that would
1 7
have arrived had Taxman not reached settlement.
Furthermore, even if one accepts the notion that Title VII
permits only those race-based employment policies that serve
remedial objectives and prohibits such policies when they are
168
instituted for purposes of academic diversity, it is not clear
that this principle, if ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court,
should prevent school boards from utilizing race-based employment policies under the anti-dumping rationale. As discussed infra, the anti-dumping rationale differs significant!~
1 9
from the more generalized rationale of academic diversity.
The First Amendment "concern" identified by Justice Powell in
Bakke - i.e., the academic freedom of educational institutions
170
to determine "who may teach?" and "how it may be taught?"
- are still undoubtedly extant within the anti-dumping rationale. However, the anti-dumping rationale is also properly characterized as a remedial objective. In essence, in the context of
special education, race-based employment decisions serve to
remedy the adverse effects of a culturally and racially-biased
referral and assessment system. By consciously placing educators of color at the gates of the special education system, school
boards can cure the defects of a system tainted with unconscious racial bias. Although the anti-dumping rationale may be
a variant of the diversity rationale, it is a variant that also
qualifies as a remedial objective. This objective falls well within
the general overarching intent of Title VII as identified in Weber - the enabling of Blacks (and presumably other racial minorities) to enjoy the rights protected under previously enacted
anti-discrimination law.

167. See generally Mathew S. Lerner, Comment, When Diversity Leads to Adversity: The Principles of Promoting Diversity in Educational Institutions, Premonitions of
the Taxman v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1999) (arguing that the decision by civil rights leaders to settle Taxman was rational); see also
Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges Five
Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 229, 230 (1999) (arguing that Taxman is at
best a "quirky" case to decide the fate of non-remedial affirmative action under Title
VII).

168. Indeed, the Taxman decision takes this principle even further, holding that
there are only two types of remedial objectives that can justify race-based employment
policy under Title VII. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
169. See supra Section IV.A.1 (distinguishing the differences between the antidumping rationale and the diversity rationale).
170. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The separate and unequal system of special education in
America's public schools poses a grave problem that adversely
affects black and other minority children nationwide, with students of color being disproportionately referred and assigned to
unchallenging and intellectually vacuous special education
programs. Despite the intent of IDEA and its subsequently enacted amendments to provide a free and appropriate education
to those children having individualized educational needs, unconscious racial and cultural bias within the largely subjective
referral and assessment process persist. To the extent that race
can serve as an efficient proxy for culture and class, race-based
employment policies that use race as a single consideration in
the hiring and placement of special educators can work effectively to remedy this deeply entrenched problem.
Such policies face significant legal obstacles, namely the
strict judicial scrutiny required under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VII. However, when implemented to prevent
the "dumping" of black and minority children into separate
classrooms based on teachers' subjective considerations and assessments, such employment policies, if narrowly enough tailored, should survive both Constitutional and statutory challenges.
Although this Article proposes that narrowly-tailored raceconscious employment policies are both Constitutionally and
statutorily appropriate, this question continues to remain one
yet to be answered in the wake of the Taxman settlement. Until another similar case comes along, however, school boards
and other entities of educational governance should make
strong efforts to make race a significant consideration in the
hiring and placement of special educators. Otherwise, special
education classrooms will continue to act as magnets pulling
minority students out ofthe educational mainstream.

